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Predictive Brain

How Expectations Shape the Perception of reality.

 · 15 min read

In the pre­vi­ous text, we ex­plored the ques­tion of why the hu­man brain can en­ter a wide spec­trum of al­tered states of con­scious­ness, from med­i­ta­tion and flow to dis­so­cia­tive states. We demon­strat­ed that from an evo­lu­tion­ary per­spec­tive, the key prin­ci­ple might not be a sin­gle op­ti­mal mode of func­tion­ing, but rather the ner­vous sys­tem’s abil­i­ty to flex­i­bly change its or­ga­ni­za­tion ac­cord­ing to the cur­rent con­text.

This text builds upon that frame­work and fo­cus­es in more de­tail on pre­dic­tive pro­cess­ing—an in­flu­en­tial group of the­o­ries sug­gest­ing that dur­ing per­cep­tion, de­ci­sion-mak­ing, and bod­i­ly reg­u­la­tion, the brain does not mere­ly work with sig­nals com­ing from the en­vi­ron­ment and the or­gan­ism, but also with con­tin­u­ous­ly gen­er­at­ed ex­pec­ta­tions.

Pre­dic­tive pro­cess­ing is not a de­fin­i­tive­ly con­firmed, uni­fied the­o­ry of the brain. It is a the­o­ret­i­cal frame­work that in­te­grates re­search find­ings on per­cep­tion, at­ten­tion, learn­ing, mo­tor con­trol, and in­te­ro­cep­tion. Its main con­tri­bu­tion lies in its abil­i­ty to ex­plain how pri­or ex­pe­ri­ence, cur­rent con­text, and bod­i­ly state in­flu­ence what a per­son per­ceives and how they re­act to a sit­u­a­tion.

The Brain as an Active Interpreter, Not a Passive Recorder

In the pre­vi­ous text, we in­tro­duced the prin­ci­ples of pre­dic­tive pro­cess­ing and pre­dic­tion er­ror on a gen­er­al lev­el. Here, we ex­plore them in greater de­tail us­ing per­cep­tion it­self as an ex­am­ple.

The com­mon in­tu­itive view sug­gests that the sens­es first record the ex­ter­nal world, and the brain sub­se­quent­ly process­es the re­ceived in­for­ma­tion. In re­al­i­ty, per­cep­tion is a much more ac­tive process. Sen­so­ry sig­nals are of­ten in­com­plete, vari­able, and noisy, so the brain must con­tin­u­ous­ly es­ti­mate their most like­ly cause—per­cep­tion thus aris­es from the in­ter­ac­tion be­tween the in­for­ma­tion flow­ing from the sens­es and pri­or knowl­edge, ex­pe­ri­ences, and con­tex­tu­al ex­pec­ta­tions.

This process is usu­al­ly de­scribed as hi­er­ar­chi­cal. High­er lev­els of pro­cess­ing rep­re­sent more gen­er­al re­la­tion­ships and con­texts, while low­er lev­els deal with more spe­cif­ic prop­er­ties of stim­uli, such as edges, move­ment, col­or, sound in­ten­si­ty, or the po­si­tion of body parts. The no­tion that “it is safe in this room” is there­fore not a sin­gle iso­lat­ed pre­dic­tion, but a com­plex con­clu­sion de­rived from sen­so­ry in­for­ma­tion, mem­o­ry, bod­i­ly state, emo­tion­al ap­praisal, and knowl­edge of the so­cial con­text.

At the same time, the brain has no di­rect ac­cess to re­al­i­ty it­self, only to avail­able sig­nals—a pre­dic­tion er­ror there­fore does not mean that it “made a mis­take in de­scrib­ing re­al­i­ty,” but rather that a dis­crep­an­cy arose be­tween the in­put the sys­tem ex­pect­ed and the in­put it ac­tu­al­ly re­ceived.

The ner­vous sys­tem can re­solve such a dis­crep­an­cy in sev­er­al ways. It can ad­just its ex­pec­ta­tion, fo­cus at­ten­tion on fur­ther in­for­ma­tion, change its in­ter­pre­ta­tion of the sit­u­a­tion, or act in a way that al­ters the sen­so­ry in­put it­self. For ex­am­ple, if a per­son mis­hears a sen­tence, they might change their es­ti­mate of its mean­ing, ask for it to be re­peat­ed, or step clos­er to the speak­er. Pre­dic­tion and ac­tion are there­fore not sep­a­rate process­es.

Precision Weighting and the Role of Attention

The brain does not treat all sig­nals as equal. It con­tin­u­ous­ly es­ti­mates which pieces of in­for­ma­tion are re­li­able in a giv­en sit­u­a­tion and which should be giv­en more weight. In pre­dic­tive pro­cess­ing the­o­ries, this process is re­ferred to as pre­ci­sion weight­ing.

Here, pre­ci­sion does not mean ob­jec­tive truth. Rather, it refers to the es­ti­mat­ed re­li­a­bil­i­ty or in­for­ma­tion­al val­ue of a spe­cif­ic sig­nal. If the en­vi­ron­ment is dark and the vi­su­al in­put is un­clear, the brain may rely more heav­i­ly on pri­or ex­pec­ta­tions. Con­verse­ly, if the sen­so­ry sig­nal is dis­tinct and un­am­bigu­ous, it can more eas­i­ly cor­rect the ex­pec­ta­tion.

At­ten­tion is close­ly linked to pre­ci­sion weight­ing. In some mod­els, at­ten­tion can be un­der­stood as one of the mech­a­nisms that in­creas­es the salience of se­lect­ed sig­nals. When a per­son fo­cus­es on their breath, pain, an­oth­er per­son’s fa­cial ex­pres­sion, or a sound in the room, they change the rel­a­tive weight of this in­for­ma­tion in sub­se­quent pro­cess­ing. At­ten­tion, how­ev­er, is not en­tire­ly iden­ti­cal to pre­ci­sion weight­ing. It is one of the process­es that can de­ter­mine which sig­nals will most sig­nif­i­cant­ly in­flu­ence the re­sult­ing per­cep­tion and ac­tion.

This prin­ci­ple helps ex­plain why two peo­ple can per­ceive the same thing dif­fer­ent­ly right down to the lev­el of which in­for­ma­tion their ner­vous sys­tem pri­or­i­tizes—not just be­cause of dif­fer­ing opin­ions.

The Automatic Evaluation of Relevance and Safety

The ner­vous sys­tem con­tin­u­ous­ly process­es the bi­o­log­i­cal and be­hav­ioral rel­e­vance of a sit­u­a­tion. It eval­u­ates, for ex­am­ple, whether a cer­tain stim­u­lus is re­lat­ed to a threat, a re­ward, a chance to con­nect, a need to act, or a need to con­serve en­er­gy. A large part of these process­es oc­curs with­out con­scious de­ci­sion-mak­ing.

With­in Stephen Porges’ Poly­va­gal The­o­ry, the term neu­ro­cep­tion is used for the non-con­scious dis­tinc­tion be­tween safe­ty and threat. This term has gained pop­u­lar­i­ty, par­tic­u­lar­ly in psy­chother­a­peu­tic and pop­u­lar sci­ence cir­cles. How­ev­er, it is im­por­tant not to con­fuse it with a strict­ly de­fined and uni­ver­sal­ly con­firmed neu­ro­bi­o­log­i­cal mech­a­nism. Some spe­cif­ic anatom­i­cal and evo­lu­tion­ary claims of Poly­va­gal The­o­ry are sub­ject to aca­d­e­m­ic crit­i­cism.

A more wide­ly ac­cept­ed gen­er­al find­ing is that the brain and the au­to­nom­ic ner­vous sys­tem re­act to bi­o­log­i­cal­ly sig­nif­i­cant stim­uli with­out all the in­ter­me­di­ate steps hav­ing to en­ter con­scious­ness. Such pro­cess­ing can af­fect pos­ture, mus­cle ten­sion, breath­ing, heart rate, hor­mon­al reg­u­la­tion, at­ten­tion, and readi­ness to act.

The re­sult­ing mean­ing of a sit­u­a­tion does not stem sole­ly from the cur­rent stim­u­lus. It can be schemat­i­cal­ly ex­pressed as fol­lows:

Mean­ing of ex­pe­ri­ence = a func­tion of the cur­rent stim­u­lus, pri­or ex­pe­ri­ence, bod­i­ly state, and so­cial con­text.

This is not a math­e­mat­i­cal equa­tion in­tend­ed for pre­cise cal­cu­la­tion, but an il­lus­tra­tive ex­pres­sion show­ing that the same event does not nec­es­sar­i­ly hold the same mean­ing for dif­fer­ent peo­ple.

The phys­i­cal close­ness of an­oth­er per­son, for in­stance, can be as­so­ci­at­ed with trust, sup­port, and calm. For some­one else, that ex­act same close­ness might trig­ger height­ened vig­i­lance, es­pe­cial­ly if it has been linked in the past to un­pre­dictabil­i­ty, re­jec­tion, or a loss of con­trol. Such a re­ac­tion may not be a con­scious choice and can­not sim­ply be con­sid­ered a char­ac­ter trait. It can re­flect learned ex­pec­ta­tions that au­to­mat­i­cal­ly in­flu­ence at­ten­tion, bod­i­ly reg­u­la­tion, and the in­ter­pre­ta­tion of the sit­u­a­tion.

How­ev­er, this does not mean the re­ac­tion is im­mutable or en­tire­ly be­yond the reach of con­scious in­flu­ence. Au­to­mat­ic ex­pec­ta­tions can be mod­u­lat­ed by cur­rent in­for­ma­tion, reg­u­la­tion of at­ten­tion, the re­la­tion­ship with the oth­er per­son, con­scious reap­praisal, and re­peat­ed new ex­pe­ri­ences.

Predicting One’s Own Body: Interoception and Organism Regulation

Pre­dic­tive pro­cess­ing does not ap­ply sole­ly to the ex­ter­nal world. The ner­vous sys­tem must also con­tin­u­ous­ly es­ti­mate and reg­u­late the in­ter­nal state of the or­gan­ism. This process is tied to in­te­ro­cep­tion—the pro­cess­ing of sig­nals con­vey­ing in­for­ma­tion about heart rate, breath­ing, vis­cer­al process­es, tem­per­a­ture, hunger, thirst, meta­bol­ic needs, and oth­er as­pects of in­ter­nal phys­i­ol­o­gy.

At the same time, bod­i­ly ex­pe­ri­ence aris­es through the col­lab­o­ra­tion of in­te­ro­cep­tion with oth­er sys­tems. Pro­pri­o­cep­tion pro­vides in­for­ma­tion about the body’s po­si­tion and move­ment, no­ci­cep­tion about po­ten­tial­ly dam­ag­ing stim­uli, and ex­te­ro­cep­tion about the sur­round­ing en­vi­ron­ment. The brain in­te­grates this in­for­ma­tion with mem­o­ry, con­text, and ex­pec­ta­tions.

In pre­dic­tive mod­els of in­te­ro­cep­tion, the brain does not mere­ly re­ceive bod­i­ly sig­nals pas­sive­ly. It con­tin­u­ous­ly es­ti­mates what state of the or­gan­ism can be ex­pect­ed and at­tempts to keep phys­i­o­log­i­cal vari­ables with­in lim­its com­pat­i­ble with cur­rent needs. This prin­ci­ple is re­lat­ed to home­osta­sis (the main­te­nance of in­ter­nal sta­bil­i­ty) as well as to al­losta­sis (the an­tic­i­pa­to­ry reg­u­la­tion of fu­ture de­mands).

For in­stance, the or­gan­ism doesn’t have to wait un­til there is a com­plete lack of oxy­gen dur­ing phys­i­cal ac­tiv­i­ty. Breath­ing and heart rate change an­tic­i­pa­to­ri­ly based on the ex­pect­ed ex­er­tion. Sim­i­lar­ly, the mere thought of a de­mand­ing sit­u­a­tion can trig­ger phys­i­cal prepa­ra­tion be­fore the sit­u­a­tion ac­tu­al­ly oc­curs.

Interoception and Emotions

The re­la­tion­ship be­tween bod­i­ly sig­nals and emo­tions is the sub­ject of sev­er­al dif­fer­ent the­o­ries. Pre­dic­tive and con­struc­tivist ap­proach­es em­pha­size that emo­tion­al ex­pe­ri­ence does not arise mere­ly as a hard-wired au­to­mat­ic re­ac­tion to an ex­ter­nal stim­u­lus. It is also shaped by how the brain in­ter­prets the bod­i­ly state in light of con­text, pri­or ex­pe­ri­ence, and cur­rent ex­pec­ta­tions.

This as­ser­tion, how­ev­er, does not im­ply that all emo­tions are sim­ply con­scious in­ter­pre­ta­tions of bod­i­ly changes. Emo­tion­al process­es can oc­cur rapid­ly and with­out con­scious de­lib­er­a­tion. Fur­ther­more, there is no con­sen­sus among sci­en­tists that all emo­tions arise through a sin­gle mech­a­nism. Some the­o­ries em­pha­size evo­lu­tion­ar­i­ly pre­pared af­fec­tive sys­tems, while oth­ers fo­cus on ap­praisal process­es, learn­ing, or the con­struc­tion of emo­tion­al cat­e­gories.

It is well doc­u­ment­ed, how­ev­er, that bod­i­ly states in­flu­ence emo­tion­al ex­pe­ri­ence. Sim­i­lar or par­tial­ly over­lap­ping phys­i­o­log­i­cal changes—such as an el­e­vat­ed heart rate, quick­ened breath­ing, and mus­cle ten­sion—can be ex­pe­ri­enced in dif­fer­ent con­texts as anx­i­ety, anger, arousal, or joy­ful an­tic­i­pa­tion.

What mat­ters is not just the phys­i­cal change it­self, but its pre­sumed cause. An ac­cel­er­at­ed heart­beat dur­ing a run usu­al­ly doesn’t prompt the same in­ter­pre­ta­tion as an ac­cel­er­at­ed heart­beat dur­ing a con­fronta­tion­al ar­gu­ment. The mean­ing of the bod­i­ly sig­nal is co-cre­at­ed by the sit­u­a­tion, at­ten­tion, mem­o­ry, and ex­pec­ta­tions.

This helps ex­plain why the same per­son might in­ter­pret sim­i­lar bod­i­ly sen­sa­tions dif­fer­ent­ly at var­i­ous stages of life. If the con­text, ex­pe­ri­ence, or be­liefs about the mean­ing of the bod­i­ly state change, the re­sult­ing emo­tion­al ex­pe­ri­ence can change as well.

Prediction Error as a Mechanism of Learning

A mis­match be­tween ex­pec­ta­tion and out­come can be an im­por­tant trig­ger for learn­ing. If an event un­folds ex­act­ly as ex­pect­ed, the ner­vous sys­tem usu­al­ly lacks a strong rea­son to al­ter its ex­ist­ing mod­el. If, how­ev­er, some­thing un­ex­pect­ed oc­curs, in­for­ma­tion aris­es in­di­cat­ing that cur­rent as­sump­tions may be in­suf­fi­cient.

The term pre­dic­tion er­ror is used in sev­er­al fields and may not al­ways de­note the ex­act same mech­a­nism. In per­cep­tion, it can mean the dif­fer­ence be­tween ex­pect­ed and re­ceived sen­so­ry in­put. In re­in­force­ment learn­ing, it can sig­ni­fy the dis­crep­an­cy be­tween an ex­pect­ed and an ac­tu­al­ly ob­tained re­ward. In mem­o­ry re­search, it can re­fer to the vi­o­la­tion of ex­pec­ta­tions when re­triev­ing a past ex­pe­ri­ence.

It is there­fore in­ac­cu­rate to as­sume that every sur­prise au­to­mat­i­cal­ly leads to a mod­el change. The out­come de­pends on the mag­ni­tude of the dis­crep­an­cy, its in­tel­li­gi­bil­i­ty, rep­e­ti­tion, emo­tion­al sig­nif­i­cance, the abil­i­ty to in­flu­ence the sit­u­a­tion, and the cur­rent bod­i­ly state.

A small and un­der­stand­able dis­crep­an­cy can lead to the ad­just­ment of an ex­ist­ing ex­pec­ta­tion. A mas­sive and hard-to-ex­plain dis­crep­an­cy, on the oth­er hand, might lead to the con­clu­sion that it is an ex­cep­tion or an en­tire­ly new sit­u­a­tion. The per­son may then leave the orig­i­nal mod­el un­changed and in­stead cre­ate a sep­a­rate ex­pla­na­tion.

How specif­i­cal­ly the con­text of threat ver­sus the con­text of safe­ty af­fects the out­come of such learn­ing was dis­cussed in de­tail in the first text: threat does not pre­clude learn­ing, but rather steers it to­ward re­in­forc­ing and gen­er­al­iz­ing de­fen­sive re­ac­tions, where­as a safe and man­age­able con­text opens up space for a more flex­i­ble up­dat­ing of the mod­el. Here, let’s just add that the up­date it­self is not de­pen­dent sole­ly on the lev­el of safe­ty, but also on the prop­er­ties of the dis­crep­an­cy de­scribed above—its mag­ni­tude, com­pre­hen­si­bil­i­ty, and rep­e­ti­tion—as well as the de­gree of phys­i­o­log­i­cal arousal dur­ing which the learn­ing takes place.

For ex­plo­ration, cre­ativ­i­ty, and cor­rec­tive learn­ing, a state where arousal is suf­fi­cient to main­tain at­ten­tion, but not so in­tense as to sig­nif­i­cant­ly im­pair the abil­i­ty to process new in­for­ma­tion, is gen­er­al­ly more ad­van­ta­geous. Too low an arousal can lead to dis­in­ter­est or in­suf­fi­cient en­gage­ment, while too high an arousal nar­rows at­ten­tion to the im­me­di­ate threat and fa­vors fast, au­to­mat­ic re­ac­tions. Be­tween these ex­tremes lies a broad spec­trum of states in which the ner­vous sys­tem can com­pare old ex­pec­ta­tions with new ex­pe­ri­ences and up­date them more flex­i­bly. Safe­ty is there­fore not a pre­req­ui­site for all learn­ing—how­ev­er, it can be a cru­cial con­di­tion for those forms of learn­ing that re­quire open­ness, ex­plo­ration, tol­er­ance of un­cer­tain­ty, and the will­ing­ness to ques­tion ex­ist­ing de­fen­sive strate­gies.

An ex­pe­ri­ence that dis­rupts an old ex­pec­ta­tion in a safe, un­der­stand­able, and man­age­able way can sup­port a more flex­i­ble up­date. If a per­son, for ex­am­ple, re­peat­ed­ly ex­pects re­jec­tion but en­coun­ters pre­dictable and re­spect­ful re­ac­tions in rel­e­vant sit­u­a­tions, a new ex­pec­ta­tion can grad­u­al­ly form—how ex­act­ly such an up­date oc­curs is ex­plored in more de­tail in the fol­low­ing chap­ter.

Memory Updating Is Not a Simple Overwrite

Pop­u­lar texts some­times state that a new ex­pe­ri­ence “over­writes” an old mem­o­ry. While il­lus­tra­tive, such phras­ing can be mis­lead­ing.

In ex­tinc­tion learn­ing—for in­stance, dur­ing the grad­ual weak­en­ing of fear—the orig­i­nal as­so­ci­a­tion of­ten doesn’t van­ish. In­stead, new learn­ing emerges, in­di­cat­ing that a cer­tain stim­u­lus might not sig­ni­fy dan­ger in that spe­cif­ic con­text. The old and new ex­pec­ta­tions can sub­se­quent­ly co­ex­ist. Which one man­i­fests de­pends on the sit­u­a­tion, the con­text, the lev­el of stress, and the time elapsed since the learn­ing oc­curred.

Un­der cer­tain con­di­tions, an al­ready stored mem­o­ry can also be up­dat­ed dur­ing a process known as re­con­sol­i­da­tion. When a mem­o­ry is re­ac­ti­vat­ed, it can tem­porar­i­ly be­come more sus­cep­ti­ble to mod­i­fi­ca­tion. This process is not au­to­mat­ic, how­ev­er, and can­not be con­sid­ered a sim­ple, uni­ver­sal rule. It de­pends on pre­cise tim­ing, the strength of the orig­i­nal mem­o­ry, the na­ture of the new in­for­ma­tion, and oth­er con­di­tions.

Sci­en­tif­i­cal­ly, it is there­fore more ac­cu­rate to speak of up­dat­ing ex­pec­ta­tions, the emer­gence of new com­pet­ing learn­ing, or a re­duc­tion in the prob­a­bil­i­ty of the orig­i­nal re­sponse, rather than the com­plete era­sure or over­writ­ing of the old mod­el.

Why Intellectual Insight Alone Is Sometimes Not Enough

A per­son might in­tel­lec­tu­al­ly know that a cer­tain sit­u­a­tion is not dan­ger­ous, yet still ex­pe­ri­ence a strong phys­i­cal or emo­tion­al re­ac­tion to it. This does not mean their con­scious knowl­edge is false or mean­ing­less. Rather, it demon­strates that de­clar­a­tive un­der­stand­ing does not au­to­mat­i­cal­ly al­ter all com­po­nents of a learned re­sponse.

Mem­o­ry and learn­ing are not stored in a sin­gle “cen­ter”. De­clar­a­tive knowl­edge, emo­tion­al as­so­ci­a­tions, mo­tor habits, au­to­nom­ic re­ac­tions, and sit­u­a­tion­al ex­pec­ta­tions uti­lize par­tial­ly dis­tinct but in­ter­con­nect­ed neur­al sys­tems. There­fore, a per­son might be able to ac­cu­rate­ly ex­plain the ori­gin of their fear with­out their heart rate, mus­cle ten­sion, or avoid­ance ten­den­cies in­stant­ly chang­ing upon en­coun­ter­ing the spe­cif­ic stim­u­lus.

To change an au­to­mat­ic re­ac­tion, a new ex­pe­ri­ence might be nec­es­sary—one that takes place di­rect­ly in the sit­u­a­tion where the old ex­pec­ta­tion is ac­ti­vat­ed. Be­hav­ioral ex­per­i­ments, ex­po­sure, be­hav­ioral change, at­ten­tion reg­u­la­tion, so­mat­ic work, and a safe re­la­tion­al con­text can all play cru­cial roles here.

This does not mean that ver­bal psy­chother­a­py works sole­ly through in­tel­lec­tu­al ex­pla­na­tion. Many well-es­tab­lished ther­a­peu­tic ap­proach­es com­bine di­a­logue with emo­tion­al ex­pe­ri­ence, new be­hav­ior, ex­po­sure, skills train­ing, and changes in how a per­son in­ter­prets their own bod­i­ly re­ac­tions. By the same to­ken, one can­not gen­er­al­ly claim that so­mat­i­cal­ly fo­cused ap­proach­es are al­ways more ef­fec­tive than talk ther­a­pies. In­di­vid­ual meth­ods dif­fer in their ev­i­dence base, modal­i­ties of work, and suit­abil­i­ty for spe­cif­ic dif­fi­cul­ties.

It is more ac­cu­rate to state that for cer­tain deeply con­di­tioned re­ac­tions, ver­bal in­sight alone may not suf­fice, and that ef­fec­tive change of­ten en­com­pass­es mul­ti­ple lev­els of ex­pe­ri­ence si­mul­ta­ne­ous­ly.

Why the Predictive Processing Framework Is Useful

Pre­dic­tive pro­cess­ing helps ex­plain why a per­son does not per­ceive the world as a neu­tral dataset. Per­cep­tion is al­ways col­ored by pri­or ex­pe­ri­ence, ex­pec­ta­tions, at­ten­tion, bod­i­ly state, and cur­rent goals.

This frame­work also high­lights that the out­come of a sur­pris­ing ex­pe­ri­ence is not a giv­en—it de­pends on the con­text and the char­ac­ter­is­tics of the dis­crep­an­cy, as de­scribed above. It also helps us un­der­stand why ra­tio­nal com­pre­hen­sion of a sit­u­a­tion alone some­times fails to im­me­di­ate­ly change an au­to­mat­ic bod­i­ly or be­hav­ioral re­sponse.

The pre­dic­tive frame­work can also be high­ly use­ful in study­ing al­tered states of con­scious­ness. Med­i­ta­tion, pro­longed sen­so­ry stim­u­la­tion, sleep de­pri­va­tion, psy­choac­tive sub­stances, in­tense emo­tion­al arousal, or dis­so­ci­a­tion can—in var­i­ous ways—al­ter the re­la­tion­ship be­tween ex­pec­ta­tions, sen­so­ry in­puts, at­ten­tion, and the es­ti­mat­ed re­li­a­bil­i­ty of in­di­vid­ual sig­nals.

Pre­dic­tive pro­cess­ing, how­ev­er, does not sin­gle-hand­ed­ly ex­plain every al­tered state of con­scious­ness. Rather, it of­fers a com­mon lan­guage through which we can for­mu­late hy­pothe­ses about why—un­der cer­tain cir­cum­stances—the per­cep­tion of the body, time, space, self-iden­ti­ty, or the mean­ing of sen­so­ry stim­uli shifts.

Conclusion

The brain can­not be ac­cu­rate­ly de­scribed as a pas­sive recorder of ex­ter­nal re­al­i­ty. Per­cep­tion aris­es from the ac­tive in­te­gra­tion of in­com­ing sig­nals with pri­or ex­pe­ri­ence, cur­rent con­text, bod­i­ly state, and ex­pec­ta­tions.

Pre­dic­tive pro­cess­ing rep­re­sents an in­flu­en­tial the­o­ret­i­cal frame­work as­sert­ing that the brain con­tin­u­ous­ly gen­er­ates es­ti­mates about the like­ly caus­es of sen­so­ry and bod­i­ly sig­nals. A dis­crep­an­cy be­tween ex­pec­ta­tion and in­put can lead to a mod­el ad­just­ment, a shift in at­ten­tion, or an ac­tion that al­ters the sit­u­a­tion it­self.

This frame­work al­lows for the in­te­gra­tion of re­search on per­cep­tion, in­te­ro­cep­tion, emo­tions, learn­ing, and or­gan­ism reg­u­la­tion. At the same time, how­ev­er, it is cru­cial not to treat it as a de­fin­i­tive­ly proven uni­fied the­o­ry of the brain, nor to use it to uni­lat­er­al­ly ex­plain all psy­cho­log­i­cal and ther­a­peu­tic process­es.

Its pri­ma­ry val­ue lies in demon­strat­ing per­cep­tion as a dy­nam­ic process. What a per­son ex­pe­ri­ences as re­al­i­ty is not a mere im­print of the sur­round­ing world, but the out­come of an on­go­ing en­counter be­tween what the ner­vous sys­tem ex­pects and what in­for­ma­tion is cur­rent­ly ar­riv­ing from the en­vi­ron­ment and their own body.