Consent to a practice does not mean consent to its continuation under all circumstances

The need for continuous verification that consent remains valid.

26/07/2026 · 7 min read

Con­sent is some­times un­der­stood as a de­ci­sion whose va­lid­i­ty only needs to be con­firmed at the be­gin­ning of a ses­sion. This view, how­ev­er, over­looks one cru­cial dis­tinc­tion—the dif­fer­ence be­tween con­sent­ing to a prac­tice and ac­cept­ing the risks as­so­ci­at­ed with it.

Con­sent to a prac­tice pri­mar­i­ly con­cerns an­oth­er per­son’s ac­tions: what they may do, to what ex­tent, un­der what con­di­tions, and for how long. When a mod­el con­sents to a par­tic­u­lar form of ty­ing, they give the rig­ger per­mis­sion to car­ry out the agreed ac­tiv­i­ty with­in the agreed bound­aries. They may also ac­cept that the ex­pe­ri­ence could pro­voke fear, pan­ic, freez­ing, shame, dis­so­ci­a­tion, or an­oth­er un­fore­seen re­ac­tion.

Ac­cept­ing this risk, how­ev­er, does not amount to ad­vance con­sent for the ac­tiv­i­ty to con­tin­ue un­changed once the risk ma­te­ri­alis­es. In­for­ma­tion about a risk en­ables a per­son to de­cide whether to en­ter a sit­u­a­tion. It does not de­ter­mine in ad­vance what should hap­pen if that risk ac­tu­al­ly oc­curs.

It is there­fore not enough to say, “But we dis­cussed be­fore­hand that this might hap­pen.”

Such a state­ment con­firms that the risk was com­mu­ni­cat­ed. It does not, how­ev­er, an­swer whether the re­sponse to it was ap­pro­pri­ate, whether the per­son be­ing tied was still able to in­flu­ence the sit­u­a­tion, or whether their cur­rent state al­lowed their orig­i­nal con­sent to be re­gard­ed as on­go­ing.

A re­ac­tion is not a de­ci­sion. The body and mind may re­spond to a sit­u­a­tion with­out con­scious choice, some­times even in con­tra­dic­tion to it. A per­son may want to con­tin­ue while si­mul­ta­ne­ous­ly feel­ing afraid. They may want to stop even though their body is re­spond­ing with arousal. They may be­come rigid, stop speak­ing, or me­chan­i­cal­ly fol­low in­struc­tions with­out want­i­ng the ac­tiv­i­ty to con­tin­ue.

A pos­i­tive bod­i­ly re­sponse there­fore does not, in it­self, prove the pres­ence of con­sent. Like­wise, cry­ing, trem­bling, or fear do not au­to­mat­i­cal­ly prove that con­sent has been vi­o­lat­ed. Re­ac­tions and con­sent ex­ist on dif­fer­ent lev­els. A re­ac­tion does, how­ev­er, pro­vide new in­for­ma­tion that may al­ter the con­di­tions un­der which fur­ther con­sent is pos­si­ble.

This dis­tinc­tion ex­plains why even a sit­u­a­tion agreed upon in ad­vance may be ex­pe­ri­enced sub­jec­tive­ly as a vi­o­la­tion of con­sent. An agree­ment does not guar­an­tee that a per­son will con­tin­ue to per­ceive the sit­u­a­tion as some­thing they are still choos­ing through­out its du­ra­tion. If their body or mind be­gins to ex­pe­ri­ence the sit­u­a­tion as a threat, help­less­ness, or loss of con­trol, their sense of au­thor­ship over their own de­ci­sion may break down. The ex­pe­ri­ence then ceas­es to feel like some­thing the per­son is do­ing and be­gins to feel like some­thing that is be­ing done to them.

For a per­son to re­main a sub­ject—some­one who ac­tive­ly co-cre­ates the ex­pe­ri­ence—rather than be­com­ing mere­ly an ob­ject be­ing ma­nip­u­lat­ed, they must have a gen­uine op­por­tu­ni­ty to in­flu­ence what is hap­pen­ing to them. This op­por­tu­ni­ty does not con­sist sole­ly of the right to say stop. It also in­cludes ac­cess to slow­ing down, chang­ing, paus­ing, re­con­sid­er­ing, or end­ing the sit­u­a­tion with­out hav­ing to jus­ti­fy why their needs have changed.

The per­son be­ing tied may not im­me­di­ate­ly recog­nise or com­mu­ni­cate this change. They may freeze, adapt, or con­tin­ue be­cause they do not want to dis­ap­point the oth­er per­son or “ruin” the shared ex­pe­ri­ence. Si­lence, im­mo­bil­i­ty, and co­op­er­a­tion are there­fore not, in them­selves, re­li­able con­fir­ma­tions of on­go­ing con­sent; their mean­ing de­pends on the con­text.

The state­ment “but we agreed to this” does not an­swer whether con­sent re­mained present in every sub­se­quent mo­ment. On its own, how­ev­er, it does not de­ter­mine the de­gree of re­spon­si­bil­i­ty borne by the oth­er per­son ei­ther. It is there­fore nec­es­sary to dis­tin­guish be­tween a new­ly dis­cov­ered bound­ary, a change in con­sent that was not ex­ter­nal­ly recog­nis­able, and a sit­u­a­tion in which avail­able sig­nals were ig­nored.

If a mod­el dis­cov­ers a new bound­ary dur­ing an agreed ac­tiv­i­ty and the rig­ger stops or changes the course of the ses­sion once it is com­mu­ni­cat­ed, this does not nec­es­sar­i­ly con­sti­tute a fail­ure of con­sent. If in­ter­nal con­sent changes with­out any recog­nis­able out­ward signs, the per­son be­ing tied may au­then­ti­cal­ly ex­pe­ri­ence a vi­o­la­tion of their au­ton­o­my even though the oth­er per­son did not know­ing­ly dis­re­gard their state. A clear vi­o­la­tion oc­curs when some­one ig­nores the with­draw­al of con­sent, an ex­pressed bound­ary, or clear signs of se­vere dis­tress, or con­tin­ues in a way that was not agreed upon.

Con­sent there­fore can­not be a one-time act com­plet­ed be­fore the ses­sion be­gins. The ini­tial “yes” opens the space for an ex­pe­ri­ence with­in agreed bound­aries, but what fol­lows must re­spond to the per­son’s cur­rent state. Pan­ic alone does not nec­es­sar­i­ly prove that con­sent has been vi­o­lat­ed. Once it af­fects a per­son’s abil­i­ty to com­mu­ni­cate, ori­ent them­selves, and make free de­ci­sions, how­ev­er, it is no longer pos­si­ble sim­ply to rely on the orig­i­nal con­sent and con­tin­ue with­out mak­ing changes.

An agree­ment ceas­es to be a suf­fi­cient ba­sis for con­tin­u­ing when the in­ter­nal state of one of the par­tic­i­pants changes rad­i­cal­ly. This does not mean that every in­vis­i­ble in­ter­nal change au­to­mat­i­cal­ly es­tab­lish­es fault on the part of the oth­er per­son. It does mean, how­ev­er, that the orig­i­nal agree­ment can­not au­to­mat­i­cal­ly jus­ti­fy con­tin­u­ing once the change be­comes ap­par­ent or rea­son­ably recog­nis­able.

When we stop look­ing at the per­son and be­gin look­ing only at the rules, we ig­nore the present mo­ment. Rules and pri­or agree­ments should pro­vide a frame­work, not re­place at­ten­tive­ness. The per­son who en­tered the ses­sion ten min­utes ago may not be in the same psy­cho­log­i­cal and bod­i­ly state as the per­son who is in it now.

On­go­ing at­ten­tion is there­fore an ex­pres­sion of pro­found re­spect and safe­ty. It ac­knowl­edges that the hu­man mind and body are com­plex sys­tems that may change un­ex­pect­ed­ly dur­ing an in­tense ex­pe­ri­ence. It car­ries with­in it the of­fer, “I am here with you, and I see you as you are now, not only as you were ten min­utes ago.”

The rig­ger’s re­spon­si­bil­i­ty there­fore does not end with pro­vid­ing in­for­ma­tion and ob­tain­ing ver­bal con­sent. It in­cludes on­go­ing at­ten­tion, an ap­pro­pri­ate pace, sen­si­tiv­i­ty to un­usu­al changes in be­hav­iour, and a will­ing­ness to al­ter the orig­i­nal plan. This does not mean hav­ing a duty to iden­ti­fy every hid­den emo­tion cor­rect­ly or tak­ing com­plete re­spon­si­bil­i­ty for an­oth­er per­son’s in­ner world. It does mean, how­ev­er, not clos­ing one’s eyes to what is ac­tu­al­ly present in the sit­u­a­tion.

On­go­ing con­sent is also not mere­ly a mat­ter of re­peat­ed­ly ask­ing, “Is this okay?” A me­chan­i­cal­ly posed ques­tion may have lit­tle val­ue if the per­son is un­able to an­swer, does not feel safe ex­press­ing dis­agree­ment, or as­sumes that only one re­sponse is ac­cept­able. On­go­ing con­sent means guid­ing the sit­u­a­tion in such a way that con­tin­u­ing, chang­ing, and stop­ping are all gen­uine­ly avail­able op­tions.

To stop pay­ing at­ten­tion is to leave the oth­er per­son alone in their ex­pe­ri­ence. On­go­ing con­sent is a com­mit­ment not to let them be­come lost in it by them­selves—to re­main with them not only phys­i­cal­ly, but also through at­ten­tion and aware­ness. It is pre­cise­ly this pres­ence that helps pre­serve hu­man dig­ni­ty and agency, even in a sit­u­a­tion that may in­volve sur­ren­der, re­strict­ed move­ment, or work­ing with help­less­ness.

Well-man­aged con­sent does not guar­an­tee that an un­com­fort­able or sur­pris­ing re­ac­tion will nev­er arise. It is a frame­work that makes it pos­si­ble to en­ter un­cer­tain­ty with­out sur­ren­der­ing one’s au­ton­o­my in ad­vance, while also cre­at­ing a safer space for self-dis­cov­ery.

Ac­cept­ing risk al­lows us to en­ter un­cer­tain­ty. It does not mean con­sent­ing to the dis­re­gard of what­ev­er may arise with­in it.